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NOTES 
THE UNITED STATES JORDAN FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT, UNITED STATES 
CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND 
THE UNITED STATES SINGAPORE 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: 
ADVANCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRESERVATION? 
I. INTRODUCTION  
ost countries agree, at least on some level, that the en-
vironment should be preserved.1  However, the level of 
environmental protection that is adequate or attainable for a 
particular country depends on a host of factors and priorities.2  
A developing country may determine a particular production 
method is preferable because of its income earning potential 
despite its deleterious effect on the environment.3  Free trade 
agreements compound the dilemma of discerning how to ade-
quately protect the environment while preserving sovereignty.4       
The United States (“U.S.”) has entered into a plethora of 
trade agreements that purport to preserve the environment.  
First, the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) 
  
 1. There are numerous international environmental organizations that 
have created a forum to discuss and exchange information on environmental 
issues.  See International Society for Environmental Preservation, at http:// 
www.isep.at/about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004); Trade & Environ-
ment.org, at http://www.trade-environment.org/ page/about.htm (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2004); ICLEI, at http://www3.iclei.org/member.htm (last visited Apr. 
14, 2004).       
 2. See generally Jack I. Garvey, AFTA After NAFTA: Regional Trade 
Blocs and the Propagation of Environmental and Labor Standards, 15 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 245, 249–50 (1997) (explaining the relationship between 
environmental protection and a country’s developmental stage). 
 3. See id.  
 4. See generally George William Mugwanya, Global Free Trade Vis-à-vis 
Environmental Regulation and Sustainable Development: Reinvigorating 
Efforts Towards a More Integrated Approach, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 401, 
402 (1999). 
M 
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claimed to protect the environment by placing environmental 
provisions in non-binding side agreements.5  Three of the 
agreements following NAFTA, the Jordan Free Trade Agree-
ment (“JFTA”), the United States Chile Free Trade (“USCFTA”) 
and the United States Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
(“USSFTA”), employed varied methods allegedly aimed at envi-
ronmental preservation.6  This Note argues that JFTA, 
USCFTA and USSFTA do not possess the language or enforce-
ment mechanisms necessary to truly protect the environment.           
Part II of this Note explains the debate between free trade 
advocates and environmentalists regarding environmental pro-
visions in free trade agreements.  Part III provides background 
on JFTA, including its legislative history.  Further, it analyzes 
the environmental provisions of JFTA and argues that JFTA 
will not safeguard the environment because the environmental 
provisions are ambiguous and are not subject to a binding dis-
pute settlement process.  Part IV briefly reviews the treatment 
of monetary sanctions regarding the environment in the 
USCFTA and USSFTA that differs from JFTA.  It also argues 
that this mechanism does not advance environmental preserva-
tion because it fails to place the environment on the same level 
as trade.  Lastly, in Part V, it provides suggestions for estab-
  
 5. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, opened for 
signature Sept. 8. 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].  
NAAEC is a side agreement under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].  
NAFTA was met with criticism from environmental groups and agencies.  
Environmentalists feared NAFTA would promote environmentally insensitive 
growth, and others thought trade liberalization would be used as a means to 
preempt domestic environmental regulations. See Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA 
Living Up to its Green Expectations?  Effective Law Enforcement Under The 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1591, 1592 (1999).  Environmentalists also feared that polluting industries 
would move from a country with stringent environmental regulations to coun-
tries with fewer environmental standards.  Id. at 1592.   
 6. The free trade agreements are available on the website of the United 
States Trade Representative.  Agreement Between the United States of Amer-
ica and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free 
Trade Area, at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/textagr.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2004) [hereinafter JFTA]; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agree-
ment, at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/final/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2004) 
[hereinafter USCFTA]; U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, at http://www. 
ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/final/2004-01-15-final.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 
2004) [hereinafter USSFTA]. 
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lishing an environmental model for future free trade agree-
ments that permit the U.S. and its trading partners to achieve 
an environmental regime that both advances environmental 
preservation and preserves sovereignty.  While my proposal is 
not a perfect solution, it is an attempt to balance concerns of 
sovereignty and environmental degradation.        
II. DEBATE BETWEEN FREE TRADE ADVOCATES AND  
ENVIRONMENTALISTS 
The debate between advocates of free trade and environmen-
talists permeates free trade negotiations.7  It is highly probable 
that future trade agreements will have to withstand criticism 
from proponents and opponents of free trade.8   Therefore, an 
understanding of the divergent views of these two groups is 
essential.  JFTA, USCFTA and USSFTA endured attacks by 
both environmentalists and free trade advocates.9   
Inclusion of environmental provisions within free trade agree-
ments remains controversial.10  Environmentalists believe that 
free trade agreements and environmental regulations are 
reconcilable and work in concert.11  Environmentalists contend 
that free trade causes a “race to the bottom,” in which compa-
nies move their operations to the trading partner with the low-
  
 7. See Bugeda, supra note 5, at 1591. 
 8. See Haixiao Huang & Walter C. Labys, Environment and Trade: A 
Review of Issues and Methods (2001) (surveying economic interactions be-
tween environmental and trade polices), at http://www.rri.wvu.edu/pdffiles 
/labys2001-1.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).  See also Rene Vossenaar, Ulrich 
Hoffmann & Jha Veena, Trade and Environment: Proposals and Their Possi-
ble Implications For Developing Countries (1999) (discussing the role trade 
and the environment will play in future trade negotiations from the perspec-
tive of developing countries), at http://r0.unctad.org/trade_env/docs/te-prop.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2004).  
 9. See Mary Tiemann, Library of Cong., Cong. Research Serv. Report, 
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of Environmental Provisions 
(Updated Oct. 16, 2001);  Heather Corbin, Note, The Proposed United States – 
Chile Free Trade Agreement: Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Pro-
tection, 14 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 119, 129–34 (2003); National Wild-
life Federation, Promoting Greener Trade with Chile and Singapore, ENVI-
ROaction, Nov. 20, 2002, available at http://www.nwf.org/enviroaction 
/index.cfm? articleID=123&issueId=18. 
 10. See Tiemann, supra note 9.     
 11. See Hillary French, Trade vs. the Environment?, DEFENDERS (Winter 
1999/2000).   
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est environmental standards.12  They argue that companies gain 
a competitive advantage by producing goods in nations with less 
rigorous environmental standards.13  Further, environmental-
ists argue that trade measures remain the most viable and ef-
fective mechanisms available to nations to protect themselves 
against costs resulting from environmental degradation in other 
nations, and that they are often the only effective measures 
available to establish and enforce international conventions on 
the environment.14   
On the other side of the debate are free trade advocates op-
posed to attaching environmental standards to trade deals.  
They fear that environmental regulation is being used as an 
illegitimate means for unfairly protecting domestic industry 
against foreign corporations.15  Their fear is premised on the 
philosophy of protectionism.16  Protectionism favors one group at 
the expense of the general public.17    
Protectionists are interested in constructing barriers to trade 
in an attempt to “protect” domestic industry and jobs.18  Free 
trade advocates contend that the inclusion of environmental 
provisions in trade agreements is a barrier to trade.19  This bar-
rier, they argue does not improve environmental protection.  
They reason that a country cannot afford to protect its envi-
ronment if it does not have the necessary financial resources.20      
Free trade advocates argue that free trade ensures economic 
growth which will create the financial means to protect the en-
  
 12. Corbin, supra note 9, at 121.  See also Bugeda, supra note 5, at 1591. 
 13. Corbin, supra note 9, at 121. 
 14. Id.   
 15. Mugwanya, supra note 4, at 424. 
 16. See Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the 
United States with Implications For International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 539, 540–43 (1993) (explaining the philosophy of 
protectionism) [hereinafter McGee].   
 17. Id. at 539. 
 18. Charles T. Haag, Comment, Legitimizing “Environmental” Legislation 
under the GATT in Light of the Café Panel Report: More Fuel for Protection-
ists?,  57 U. PITT. L. REV. 79, 81.  See also McGee, supra note 16, at 540. 
 19. See Tiemann, supra note 9. 
 20. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Article: Trade and Environment: Free 
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Con-
flict?, 86 A.J.I.L. 700, n.7 (1992).   
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vironment.21  Thus, the best way to encourage higher standards 
of environmental protection is through free trade, and the 
growth it creates.22  The current U.S. President, George W. 
Bush, promotes the view of free trade advocates.23   
President Bush urges that attaching environmental stan-
dards to trade deals “represents a new kind of protectionism” 
that hampers free trade.24  He contends that including environ-
mental provisions in trade agreements amounts to protection-
ism and alienates potential trading partners.25  Therefore, he 
argues that trade and the environment should not be linked.26  
  
 21. Id.  But see Chantal Thomas, Poverty Reduction, Trade and Rights, 18 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1399 (2003) (arguing that trade does not necessarily lead 
to a decrease in poverty). 
 22. Corbin, supra note 9, at 123. 
 23. President George W. Bush, Remarks at a Meeting with the Business 
Roundtable (June 20, 2001).  Speaking before a business roundtable, Presi-
dent George W. Bush made his views on the perils of linking trade with envi-
ronmental provisions quite clear.  President Bush made the following state-
ments: 
Now, there are some who are legitimately concerned about the envi-
ronment and labor, but I remind them that if you believe in trade, 
you believe that prosperity will spread.  If you believe in trading with 
a country, it will help that country grow economically and a country 
that is more prosperous is one more likely to be able to take care of 
their environment.  And a one more prosperous is one more likely to 
take care of their workforce.  And if you believe in improving the en-
vironment, in helping the labor conditions in countries, don’t wall off 
those countries.  Don’t create- don’t enhance poverty by refusing to al-
low there to be trade.  Now there are some who want to put codicils 
on the trade protection authority for one reason:  they don’t like free 
trade.  They’re protectionist, and they’re isolationists.  And we must 
reject that kind of thought here in America. 
Id. 
 24. Steve Holland, Bush Warns of New Kind of Protectionism, Reuters, 
May 7, 2001, available at http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/ftaa/ 
news2001/reuters050701.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).  President Bush 
stated that 
by failing to make the case for trade we’ve allowed a new kind of pro-
tectionism to appear in this country.   It talks of workers while it op-
poses a major source of new jobs.  It talks of the environment, while 
opposing the wealth-creating policies that will pay for clean air and 
water in developing nations. 
Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Holland, supra note 24. 
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The President’s outlook on this issue is significant in light of the 
Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”) power granted to him by 
Congress.27  TPA enables the President and his advisors to ne-
gotiate trade agreements with foreign nations, while curtailing 
Congress’ power.28  Congress can vote to approve or reject the 
entire agreement, but it cannot amend the text of the agree-
ment.29  Therefore, TPA provides U.S. trade representatives 
with slight input on the progress of trade negotiations.30  Envi-
ronmentalists fear that this lack of influence in future free 
trade negotiations will result in less attention paid to the envi-
ronment.31  
III. JFTA  
Apart from the tension between environmentalists and free 
trade advocates, political forces also influence the final text of 
free trade agreements.32  JFTA was successfully implemented 
  
 27. See Globalization.org, U.S. Congress Grants President Trade Promotion 
Authority, Sept. 19, 2002, available at http://www.globalization101.org/news. 
asp?NEWS_ID =37.  In August 2002, Congress granted the President Trade 
Promotion Authority.  Id.  “The President holds this power until June 1, 2005, 
with a two-year extension automatically enacted unless Congress adopts a 
resolution of disapproval.”  Id. 
 28. Id.   
 29. Id. 
 30. See id.     
 31. See Jonathan S. Blum, Comment, The FTAA and the Fast Track to 
Forgetting the Environment: A Comparison of the NAFTA and the 
MERCOSUR Environmental Models as Examples for the Hemisphere, 35 TEX. 
INT’L  L.J. 435, 436 (2000). 
 32. Congress did not undertake any large-scale initiatives in assisting the 
Jordanian economy until Jordan and Israel achieved substantive progress on 
their bilateral track for peace.  Mary Jane Bolle, Library of Cong., Cong. Re-
search Serv. Report, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (Dec. 13, 2001) [here-
inafter Bolle I].  U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan was limited because of U.S. 
concern over Jordan’s refusal to join the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq during 
the 1990-1991 Gulf war.  Id.  However, on July 25, 1991, Jordan and Israel 
signed the Washington Declaration that terminated the state of belligerency 
between Jordan and Israel and brought forth a peace treaty on October 26, 
1991. Id.  As a result of Jordan’s peacekeeping progress, Congress and the 
Clinton Administration took a number of initiatives intended to benefit Jor-
dan’s economy.  Id.  In fact, Congress’ primary motivation behind attempting 
to improve Jordan’s economy has been to provide Jordan with a “peace divi-
dend.”  Id.  U.S. assistance seeks to specifically provide Jordan with an eco-
nomic reward designed to demonstrate the benefits of peace to a Jordanian 
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after the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Cen-
ter.33   An understanding of the legislative background and po-
litical backdrop in which JFTA was negotiated and ultimately 
signed is necessary to appreciate its structure and possible ap-
plication to future trade agreements. 
A. Environmental Provisions Debated in Congress  
The conflict between proponents of absolute free trade and 
environmentalists was apparent during JFTA negotiations.  
Significant congressional debate ensued regarding JFTA’s in-
clusion of environmental provisions.34  JFTA is the first trade 
agreement directly including provisions on environmental regu-
lation in the agreement’s main text which are subject to the 
agreement’s dispute settlement process.35   
The Senate Finance committee held a mark-up session for 
JFTA’s implementation bill, during which Republican Senator 
Phil Gramm offered an amendment that would have restricted 
the scope of JFTA’s dispute resolution mechanism when dealing 
with environmental issues.36  The amendment was rejected.37  
During the Senate debate, Senator Gramm warned that he 
would oppose any effort to turn JFTA into a model for how fu-
ture trade agreements should deal with worker’s rights and en-
vironmental protection issues.38  He argued that “including la-
bor and environmental provisions in all trade agreements would 
lead to a loss of sovereignty by the U.S. and subject the country 
to penalties for pursuing its economic self interest.”39 Senator 
Gramm urged environmental protection should be left to each 
  
population, which has at times ridiculed and protested its government’s pace 
and depth of normalizing relations with Israel.   Id.   
 33. Emily Harwood, Note, The Jordan Free Trade Agreement: Free Trade 
and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 509, 529 (2002) 
[hereinafter Harwood]. 
 34. Id. at 525–30. 
 35. JFTA, supra note 6, arts. 5, 17.  JFTA’s predecessor, NAFTA, in con-
trast, only includes environmental provisions in non-binding side agreements.  
See NAAEC, supra note 5.   
 36. Mary Jane Bolle, Library of Cong., Cong. Research Serv. Report, Jor-
dan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (Sept. 25, 2001) [hereinafter Bolle II].    
 37. Id. 
 38. Bolle I, supra note 32, at 6.  
 39. Harwood, supra note 33, at 525.  
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individual country and should not be a part of trade deals.40  
Others argued that developing nations have resisted pressure 
to tighten their environmental laws, which in light of JFTA, 
could eliminate their ability to negotiate agreements with the 
U.S.41  
On the other hand, Senate Finance Committee Chairman 
Max Baucus indicated he hoped JFTA would set a precedent for 
how future trade agreements would address issues like labor 
and the environment.42  Senator Baucus argued JFTA’s inclu-
sion of environmental provisions was a positive development.43   
He also disagreed with Senator Gramm’s statement that the 
provisions would undermine U.S. sovereignty or prevent law-
makers from enacting and enforcing U.S. environmental laws.44  
It is fair to say that Senator Gramm concurs with free trade 
advocates who oppose the inclusion of environmental provisions 
in trade agreements.45  Senator Baucus’ views coincide with en-
vironmentalists.46 
The almost year-long combat over the implementation of 
JFTA came to a halt after the September 11, 2001, attack on 
the World Trade Center.47  Many commentators, as well as the 
International Trade Commission, deemed the implementation 
of JFTA a political rather than economic decision for the U.S.48  
  
 40. Id. at 526.  
 41. Corbin, supra note 9, at 129. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Harwood, supra note 33, at 527. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 529.   
 48. See U.S. International Trade Commission, News Release: A U.S.- Jor-
dan Free Trade Agreement Would Have No Measurable Impact on U.S. Pro-
duction or U.S. Employment, Says ITC 2000, at http://www.usitc.gov/er/ 
nl2000/ER0926X1.HTM (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).  The International Trade 
Commission (“ITC”), an independent, nonpartisan, fact-finding agency com-
pleted a report for the United States Trade Representative.  Id. In the report, 
the ITC provided an overview of Jordan’s economy, data on Jordan’s trade 
patterns with the U.S. and other major trade partners, a description of the 
tariff and investment relationship between the U.S. and other major trade 
partners, and an analysis of any sector for which there are significant eco-
nomic impacts from a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement.  Id. The ITC con-
cluded that JFTA would have no measurable impacts on total U.S. exports, 
total U.S. imports, U.S. production, or U.S. employment.  Id.  See also 
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Even President George W. Bush said, “the agreement demon-
strates Jordan’s strong commitment to economic reform and 
sends a strong signal to Jordan, as well as other countries in 
the region, that support for peace and economic reform yields 
concrete benefits.”49   
After the September 11, 2001 attack, Senator Gramm 
dropped his effort to block the implementation of JFTA.50  
“Senator Gramm explained that he decided not to oppose the 
agreement because it was important that the U.S. send a signal 
of friendship to Jordan, an ally that could be instrumental in 
building Middle East support for military and other action 
against the terrorists.”51  Arguably, if the September 11, 2001, 
attack on the World Trade Center did not occur, the proposed 
JFTA would not have been implemented.52    
B.  Environmental Provisions  
Several provisions were included within JFTA that were in-
tended to promote environmental preservation.  JFTA’s inclu-
sion of environmental provisions that are subject to JFTA’s dis-
pute settlement provisions is controversial.53  While JFTA is 
unprecedented in this respect, JFTA fails to provide the power-
ful and unequivocal language that compels environmental pres-
ervation.54  
1.  Preamble 
JFTA’s preamble appears to demonstrate concern for envi-
ronmental protection.55  It contains the stipulations agreed to by 
  
CNN.com, U.S., Jordan Link Trade and Peace With New Agreement, Oct. 24, 
2000, available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/10/24/jordan.us.trade.02/ 
index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
 49. United States of America Embassy, Text: Bush Welcomes Passage of 
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, at http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/ 
publish/peace/archives/2001/september/092512a.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2004). 
 50. Harwood, supra note 33, at 529.   
 51. Id. at 529–30.  
 52. See generally Harwood, supra note 33, at 529. 
 53. Bolle II, supra note 36.  
 54. Id.   
 55. JFTA, supra note 6, preamble.   
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the U.S. and Jordan.56  The preamble also sets the context for 
interpretation of the environmental provisions contained within 
the agreement.57  
At first glance, the preamble appears to reinforce the impor-
tance of environmental preservation.  Closer examination of the 
preamble uncovers that it is loosely worded and susceptible of 
interpretations that do little to protect the environment.  The 
preamble commits the U.S. and Jordan to recognize the objec-
tive of sustainable development while seeking both to protect 
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for 
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development.58  
The phrase “sustainable development” is not defined by 
JFTA.  This phrase is ambiguous and has garnered multiple 
meanings.59  The World Commission on the Environment and 
Development (“World Commission”), a commission established 
by the United Nations to promote the study and protection of 
the environment, defined sustainable development as develop-
ment which “meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”60  
As one commentator noted, this definition does not provide a 
fixed target that can be set, pursued and definitively obtained.61  
Further, this definition relies on the projection of future needs 
that are not discernible.62  Arguably, if the definition promul-
  
The Government of the U.S. and the Government of Jordan, . . . Rec-
ognizing the objective of sustainable development, and seeking both 
to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means 
for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development. . . . Wishing to 
promote effective enforcement of their respective environmental and 
labor law . . . .   
Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. JFTA, supra note 6, preamble. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA’S Environmental Provisions Promote 
Sustainable Development?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 423, 431 (1995).  See also  Martin 
S. High, Sustainable Development: How Far Does U.S. Industry have to go to 
Meet World Guidelines?, 14 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 131, 137 (2003). 
 60. Stenzel, supra note 59, at 431.     
 61. Id.  
 62. See id. at 433.   
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gated by the World Commission is used by a party to interpret 
JFTA’s preamble, a party could interpret the preamble as con-
doning minimal environmental preservation provided it is not 
compromising the needs of future generations—a determination 
that is made solely by the party.  Unfortunately, JFTA does not 
provide measures for evaluating a party’s balancing of sover-
eign concerns and environmental concerns.  Therefore, it is near 
impossible to discern if a party is truly balancing sovereign con-
cerns, or just ignoring environmental concerns.  
Under the preamble, both parties are required to promote ef-
fective enforcement of their respective environmental laws.63  
Even though the preamble sets this lofty requirement for the 
U.S. and Jordan, measures are not provided within JFTA for 
ensuring that the parties actually promote effective enforce-
ment of their environmental laws.64  The preamble, similar to a 
majority of the provisions within Article V, relies on voluntary 
compliance by the parties.65 
2.   Article V: Environment 
It is notable that JFTA’s environmental provisions are in the 
body of the agreement (primarily in Article V).  However, even 
environmentalists are skeptical as to whether JFTA embodies 
the provisions that are necessary to encourage protection of the 
environment.66    
First, Article V, section one supposes that both the U.S. and 
Jordan recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by 
relaxing domestic environmental laws.67  Therefore, it is ex-
  
 63. JFTA, supra note 6, preamble.   
 64. JFTA, supra note 6. 
 65. See Batir Wardam, Researcher at the Jordanian Environmental Water 
Program, Jordanian Environmental Watch Program 14 (Mar. 2001), available 
at http://www.ujrc-jordan.org/English/JEWP/Publications.htm#1. 
 66. See Hearing on  U.S.–Jordan Free Trade Agreement Before the Senate 
Finance Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Rodger Schlickeisen, Presi-
dent of Defenders). 
 67. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 5(1).   
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by 
relaxing domestic environmental laws.  Accordingly, each Party shall 
strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or 
offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws as an encour-
agement for trade with the other Party.  
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pected that the U.S. and Jordan will strive to ensure that they 
do not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, their domestic environmental laws as 
an encouragement for trade with the country.68  The reasoning 
of this section is flawed.  Even assuming arguendo, that a party 
“recognizes” it is improper to encourage trade while sacrificing 
the environment, this recognition does not ensure that the 
party will not derogate from its environmental laws.  The for-
mer does not guarantee the latter.  For example, a party could 
recognize that it should not detract from its environmental 
laws, but choose to ignore environmental laws for economic 
gain.    
Secondly, JFTA does not provide a vehicle for enforcing com-
pliance with Article V, section one.  Enforcement of this provi-
sion will require perpetual monitoring and voluntary compli-
ance by the parties.69  Third, Article V, section one only men-
tions trade as the economic activity not to be encouraged by re-
laxing domestic laws.70  As one commentator noted, since in-
vestments are not included, JFTA leaves open the possibility of 
environmentally damaging investments that do not comply with 
environmental standards.71   
Article V, section two recognizes the right of each party to es-
tablish its own level of domestic environmental protection and 
development policies.72  It further provides that each party shall 
“strive to” ensure that its laws provide for high levels of envi-
ronmental protection and shall “strive to” improve its environ-
mental laws.73  While this portion of Article V provides the par-
ties with unlimited discretion to monitor their environmental 
  
Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Batir, supra note 65, at 14.   
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 5(2).   
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of do-
mestic environmental protection and environmental development 
policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its envi-
ronmental laws, each Party shall strive to ensure that its laws pro-
vide for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to 
continue to improve those laws. 
Id.   
 73. Id. 
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laws, it omits a method for determining what is considered 
“high levels of environmental protection.”  Further, a binding 
commitment to environmental excellence is not included within 
this provision.74  Thus, a mechanism is not provided within 
JFTA’s text for measuring whether a party’s environmental 
laws provide adequate environmental protection.  This neglect 
provides the parties with unchecked discretion that could result 
in environmental degradation.  For example, if a party’s envi-
ronmental law condoned the pouring of contaminants directly 
into the soil, it appears that JFTA would validate this law, al-
beit environmentally damaging, because it falls within the pur-
view of the party’s discretion to establish its own level of domes-
tic protection.   
Further, as one commentator noted, the words “shall strive 
to” in Article V, section two provides a complacent frame for 
applying and upgrading environmental compliance and en-
forcement.75  JFTA only requires that the parties “strive to” en-
sure that their laws provide for high levels of environmental 
protection and “strive to” continue to improve their laws.76  
Since the parties are only required to “strive to” perform these 
duties, an inference can be made that JFTA does not compel 
actual performance.  JFTA could have mandated a firmer obli-
gation on the parties by removing the words “strive to” from 
this section.  
Article V, section three, Subsection (b) condones a party’s 
course of action or inaction as long as the “action or inaction 
reflects a reasonable exercise of discretion, or results from a 
bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources.”77  This 
  
 74. Batir, supra note 65, at 15. 
 75. Id.     
 76. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 5(2). 
 77. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 5(3)(b). “A Party shall not fail to effectively 
enforce its environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of 
action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement.”  Id. art. 5(3)(a).  
The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise 
discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, 
and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the alloca-
tion of resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental 
matters determined to have higher priorities.  Accordingly, the Par-
ties understand that a Party is in compliance with subparagraph (a) 
where a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of 
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section provides the parties with significant discretion and 
flexibility in prioritizing their environmental needs and alloca-
tion of resources.78  Further, this portion of JFTA provides the 
parties with the right to exercise discretion with respect to in-
vestigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory and compliance matters, 
and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to 
other environmental matters.79   This section of JFTA subjects 
the compliance and enforcement components of JFTA to the 
availability of technical and financial resources.80  One commen-
tator noted, Article V, section three is subject to so many cave-
ats that, “in reality, it is hard to imagine any circumstance 
egregious enough to constitute a violation of the rule.”81   
3.   Joint Statement on Environmental Technical Cooperation  
The U.S. and Jordan issued a Joint Statement on Environ-
mental Technical Cooperation.82   It established a Joint Forum 
on Environmental Technical Cooperation, which works to ad-
vance environmental protection in Jordan by developing envi-
ronmental technical cooperation initiatives.  These initiatives 
take into account environmental priorities, which are agreed to 
by the U.S. and Jordan, and are consistent with the U.S. coun-
try strategic plan for Jordan, and complementary to U.S.—
Jordanian policy initiatives.83   
4.  Dispute Settlement Procedures 
The most notable characteristic of JFTA is that the environ-
mental provisions are subject to the dispute settlement proce-
dures of JFTA.  JFTA uses a multi-step process for dispute set-
tlement.84   
Under JFTA, the parties must first make every attempt to 
arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution through consultations 
  
such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the al-
location of resources. 
Id. art. 5(3)(b). 
 78. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 5(3)(b).  
 79. Id.  
 80. Batir, supra note 65, at 15. 
 81. Schlickeisen, supra note 66.  
 82. Harwood, supra note 33, at 532. 
 83. Id.     
 84. Id. at 13.    
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whenever a dispute arises concerning interpretation of the 
agreement, a party considers that the other party has failed to 
carry out its obligations under the agreement, or a party con-
siders that measures taken by the other party severely distort 
the balance of trade benefits accorded by the agreement or sub-
stantially undermine fundamental objectives of the agreement.85     
If the parties fail to resolve their dispute through consulta-
tions within sixty days, either party may refer the matter to the 
Joint Committee, which tries to resolve the dispute.86  The Joint 
Committee is an ongoing body that was established to supervise 
the proper implementation of JFTA.87  If the Joint Committee 
does not resolve the matter within either ninety days or another 
period that they have agreed upon, either party can refer the 
matter to the dispute settlement panel.88  
In order to resolve the dispute, the dispute settlement panel 
prepares non-binding recommendations in a report.89  Within 
ninety days, the dispute settlement panel has to present a re-
port to the parties containing findings of fact and its determina-
tion as to whether either party has failed to carry out its obliga-
tions under JFTA, whether a measure taken by either party 
severely distorts the balance of trade benefits accorded by  
JFTA or substantially undermines the fundamental objectives 
of JFTA.90  Regrettably, since the report is not binding, JFTA’s 
dispute settlement system really just acts as a mediator be-
tween the parties.91  
  
 85. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 17(1)(a). 
 86. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 17(1)(b).  
 87. See JFTA, supra note 6, art. 15(1).  The committee is comprised of rep-
resentatives of the U.S. and Jordan, and is headed by the USTR and Jordan’s 
Minister primarily responsible for international trade, or their designees.  Id. 
art 15(3)(a).                                                                                                                                 
 88. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 17(1)(c). “Unless otherwise agreed by the par-
ties, the panel shall be composed of three members: each Party shall appoint 
one member, and the two appointees shall choose a third who will serve as the 
chairman.” Id. 
 89. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 17(1)(d).  See also Mohammad Nsour, Article-
fundamental Facets of the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement: E-
Commerce, Dispute Resolution, and Beyond, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 742, 780 
(2004).   
 90. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 17(1)(d). 
 91. Nsour, supra note 89, at 780.  “Once the parties know the dispute reso-
lution process does not provide the teeth to enforce its own rulings, it will 
become impossible to resolve disputes through consensus, as neither party 
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After the dispute settlement panel compiles its report, the 
Joint Committee then endeavors to resolve the dispute, taking 
the report into account.92  If the Joint Committee does not re-
solve the dispute within thirty days after receiving the panel 
report, the affected party “shall be entitled to take any appro-
priate and commensurate measure.”93  This provision appears to 
permit the use of trade sanctions as an enforcement mecha-
nism.94   
5.  Side Letters 
Side letters exchanged by Jordan and the U.S. weaken any 
environmental protection provided by JFTA.  There was opposi-
tion in the House of Representatives (“House”) regarding the 
language in Article 17 of JFTA that entitles a party “to take any 
appropriate and commensurate measure” to resolve a dispute.95  
Members of the House argued that this provision allowed the 
parties to impose trade sanctions in response to environmental 
disputes.96  In response to this concern, the U.S. and Jordan ex-
changed letters.97  These letters are included within the con-
gressional record of the House.98   
The letters indicate that both governments “did not expect or 
intend to apply the agreement in a manner that results in 
blocking trade.”99  The letters further stated that each govern-
ment considers that appropriate measures for resolving any 
differences that may arise regarding the Agreement would be 
bilateral consultations and other procedures, particularly alter-
  
would compromise, knowing that there would be no serious consequences.”  
Id. at 783. 
 92. JFTA, supra note 6, art. 17(2)(a).   
 93. Id. art. 17(2)(b). 
 94. Nsour, supra note 89, at 778.  Nsour also argues that the use of trade 
sanctions may be called retaliations.  Id.  He defines retaliation as a means of 
exercising pressure on the offending government to implement the panel or 
Appellate Body ruling, and in this sense is indirectly beneficial to business.  
Id.  
 95. 147 CONG. REC. H4871 (2001). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id.  See also 147 CONG. REC. S9679 (2001). 
 99. Id. 
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native mechanisms, that will help to secure compliance without 
recourse to traditional trade sanctions.100    
It is too early to forecast whether these letters will affect the 
actions of the U.S. or Jordan if a dispute arises.  It is likely that 
the effect of these letters will hinge on the severity of the envi-
ronmental violation.  However, these letters appear to under-
mine the best attribute of JFTA—the possibility that a party 
could be subjected to trade sanctions for not complying with the 
environmental provisions of the agreement.   
C. Author’s Analysis: Does JFTA advance environmental 
preservation? 
It appears that JFTA with its sweeping and vague language 
does not contain the ammunition necessary to safeguard the 
environment.101  JFTA’s preoccupation with the preservation of 
sovereignty overwhelms the text of the agreement.  This  obses-
sion created numerous loopholes that the parties can easily 
navigate to avoid their environmental responsibilities.102   
In fact, it appears that the debate surrounding JFTA’s inclu-
sion of environmental provisions subject to the dispute settle-
ment process was overrated.  JFTA does not mandate that the 
parties do anything differently than what they have been doing.  
Therefore, it is unlikely that there will be many, if any, envi-
ronmental violations that are subjected to the dispute settle-
ment process.  Arguably, this means that if a party pre-JFTA 
was damaging the environment, it can continue doing so post-
JFTA, provided the degradation does not increase.  Some com-
mentators have opined that JFTA was an attempt to find a 
middle ground.103  “It commits both countries not to weaken or to 
fail to uphold their own existing environmental standards, but 
does not impose any new standards on them.”104 This is not ac-
ceptable because environmental degradation transcends na-
  
 100. Id. 
 101. See supra Part III.B. 
 102. See supra Part III.B. 
 103. See Richard W. Stevenson, A Nation Challenged: Trade; Senate Ap-
proves Bill to Lift Barriers to Trade with Jordan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, 
at C1.  
 104. Id. 
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tional boundaries.105 While countries should be provided with 
discretion in deciding how to implement their environmental 
laws, without an agreed upon standard or measure, countries 
are likely to keep the status quo.   If a country determines that 
its environment is adequately protected (by its own self-serving 
standards), it is unlikely to expend any monies towards envi-
ronmental preservation.   
Further, in light of the side letters exchanged between the 
parties, it is unlikely that either country will impose trade sanc-
tions for violations of JFTA’s environmental provisions.106  
Therefore, any environmental disputes would fall under the 
auspice of the non-binding dispute settlement mechanism.  In 
essence, the reports prepared by the dispute settlement panel 
are advisory.  Therefore, it is not mandated that the parties ad-
here to their recommendations.  As one commentator noted, 
once “parties are aware that the dispute resolution process does 
not provide the teeth to enforce its own rulings, it will become 
impossible to resolve disputes through consensus, as neither 
party would compromise, knowing there would be no serious 
consequences.”107   
IV. UNITED STATES CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND 
UNITED STATES SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
USCFTA and USSFTA, “as the first free trade agreements 
negotiated by the Bush administration under TPA, could poten-
tially serve as templates for future free trade agreements.”108  
Therefore, they set the mark as to what will probably be a long 
  
 105. See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, International 
Affairs, Environment, Trade and Investment, at http://www.epa.gov/ interna-
tional/trade/geninfo.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency]. 
 106. See supra Part III.B.5. 
 107. Nsour, supra note 89, at 783. 
 108. The Significance of the Singapore and Chile Free Trade Agreements: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection 
on Trade in Services and E-Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Thea 
M. Lee, Chief International Economist American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations).  See also International Trade Reporter, 
Bilateral Agreements: U.S., Singapore Complete FTA ‘Substance,’  USTR Says; 
Capital Controls Still Unresolved, Nov. 21, 2002, available at http://www.bna. 
com/itr/arch172.htm. 
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war between free trade advocates and environmentalists.109  
USCFTA is the first comprehensive trade agreement between 
the U.S. and a South American country.110 Similarly, the 
USSFTA is the first trade agreement with an Asian country.111 
Both agreements were attacked by free trade advocates and 
environmentalists.112  Some commentators argued that any ex-
pressive progress made in JFTA towards environmental  pro-
tection was negated by USCFTA and USSFTA.113  Several envi-
ronmental organizations sent letters to Congress in opposition 
to the agreements.114  
However, on September 3, 2003, President George W. Bush 
signed bills for both agreements.115 Many of the environmental 
provisions of USCFTA and USSFTA mirror  JFTA.116  A notable 
  
 109. Corbin, supra note 9, at 119. 
 110. See USCFTA, supra note 6.  
 111. The White House, Remarks by the President in Signing Ceremony for 
Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreements The East Room, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030903-3.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2004). 
 112. See Grocery Manufacturers of America, Comments Submitted: Re: 
Comments Regarding Proposed United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, at 
http://www.gmabrands.com/publicpolicy/docs/comment.cfm?DocID=789 (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2004); Center for International Environmental Law, Re: Chile 
and Singapore Free Trade Agreements are Wrong Models for the Environ-
ment, at http://www.ciel.org/Tae/Chile_Singapore_10Jul03.html (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2004). 
 113. See Citizens Trade Campaign, Letter to Representative regarding U.S.-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement May 22, 2003, at http://www.citizenstrade. 
org/pdf/ctc_sing_letter.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Citizens 
Letter].   
 114. Id.  See also Citizens Trade Campaign, Letter to Congress Regarding 
U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreements are Bad Policy as they 
Stand, July 22, 2003, available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/ctc_chile_ 
sing_ltr.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2003). 
 115. Press Release, The White House, President Bush Signs Chile, Singa-
pore Free Trade Agreement Bills (Sept. 2, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/news/ releases/2003/09/20030903-3.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
 116. See, e.g., USCFTA, supra note 6, art. 19.1.   
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of do-
mestic environmental protection and environmental development po-
lices and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environ-
mental laws, each Party shall ensure that its laws provide for high 
levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to im-
prove those laws. 
Id. 
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addition to USCFTA and USSFTA is the unique treatment of 
monetary sanctions and the environment.  
A.  Monetary Sanctions and the Environment  
Unfortunately, USCFTA and USSFTA do not place environ-
mental concerns on par with trade.117   One commentator noted 
that JFTA provided comparable enforcement through dispute 
resolution for all environmental provisions, however, only one 
environmental provision of USCFTA and USSFTA is subject to 
the dispute settlement process.118  This provision is the obliga-
tion that a party enforce its own environmental laws.119   
If a country does not enforce its environmental obligations 
and a financial assessment results, the maximum amount it can 
be assessed is fifteen million dollars annually.120  In commercial 
trade disputes, the assessment is calculated solely on trade ef-
fects.121  “Whereas monetary remedies provided for commercial 
violations are uncapped, the remedies for environmental viola-
tions are capped at fifteen million dollars regardless of the 
harm caused.”122  The USTR reasoned that since the quantifi-
able trade effect of an environmental violation is likely to be 
very small, USCFTA and USSFTA include other criteria for the 
panel to use in determining the assessment.123  Since violations 
of environmental obligations do not result in trade sanctions, it 
is possible that a country could perform a cost-benefit analysis 
and determine that it is economically more sound to pay the 
financial assessment than fulfill its environmental obligations 
under the agreement.        
  
 117. See Citizens Letter, supra note 113.   
 118. Id.   See also USSFTA, supra note 6, art. 18.7(5); USCFTA, supra note 
6, art. 19.6(8). 
 119. USCFTA, supra note 6, art. 19.2(1)(a); USSFTA, supra note 6, art. 
18.2(1)(a).   
 120. USCFTA, supra note 6, art. 22.16(2)(a); USSFTA, supra note 6, art. 
20.7(2)(f). 
 121. U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, USTR on Labor, Environment in Singapore, 
Chile FTAs, May 5, 2003, available at http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-
20030509a7.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Embassy Article]. 
 122. Citizens Letter, supra note 113. 
 123. Embassy Article, supra note 121.    
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B.  Author’s Analysis: Does the monetary remedy in USCFTA 
and USSFTA advance environmental preservation?   
The current U.S. President, George W. Bush, stated that 
USSFTA obligates the countries to enforce their environmental 
laws and makes clear that environmental protection will not be 
reduced in order to encourage trade or investment.124  USSFTA 
and USCFTA have also been characterized as containing an 
innovative enforcement mechanism that includes monetary as-
sessments to enforce environmental obligations.125  However, a 
monetary penalty is assessed only if a party does not effectively 
enforce its own laws.  This provision effects only a small uni-
verse of situations that could potentially cause environmental 
degradation.   
Further, the assessment cap provides the parties with a fig-
ure to perform a cost-benefit analysis.  This leaves open the pos-
sibility that a party could perform a cost-benefit analysis and 
determine that it is economically more sound to pay the 
financial assessment than fulfill its environmental obligations 
under the agreement.  
V.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS  
A.  Placement of Environmental Provisions Within  
the Text of Trade Agreements 
Environmental provisions must be placed within the text of 
future trade agreements and not in binding side agreements.  
Environmental provisions that are placed in side agreements 
that do not have a legal link to the main agreement, do not as-
sure  compliance with the side agreement.126  Since the parties 
are not subjected to trade sanctions for violating side agree-
  
 124. President’s Message to Congress Transmitting Legislation and Sup-
porting Documents to implement United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030715-7.ht 
ml (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
 125. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, (Dec. 
11, 2002), at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/12/02-114.htm. 
 126. See Linda DuPuis, Note: The Environmental Side Agreement Between 
Mexico and the United States—An Effective Compromise?, 8 FLA. J. INT’L L. 
471, 488 (1993) (discussing environmentalists’ criticism of NAFTA’s side 
agreement). 
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ments, it is easier for the parties to make a cost-benefit analysis 
that endangers the environment.127 
B.  Negotiation of an Environmental Standard 
JFTA, USCFTA and USSFTA went to great lengths to defend 
sovereignty.  However, an extreme position on preserving sov-
ereignty is not compatible with environmental protection.  Par-
ties must agree to relinquish even a diminutive amount of sov-
ereignty for true global environmental protection.128  Arguably, 
by entering into a free trade agreement the parties have relin-
quished some sovereignty.   
Instead of providing each party with unlimited discretion to 
adjust its environmental laws, parties should be required to 
meet an agreed upon environmental standard (“Standard”) 
within a prescribed time frame. This Standard cannot and 
should not be boilerplate.  The Standard should be negotiated to 
reflect the economic, environmental and political condition of 
the respective country.   The Standard and time frame to reach 
the agreed upon standard should also reflect the unique con-
cerns of each country.129  This reflection allows the parties to 
tailor the Standard to sovereign concerns.  While the Standard 
does require some relinquishment of sovereignty, it allows the 
parties to negotiate their own path.  Also, if the Standard, an 
agreed upon action plan to meet the standard (“Action Plan”) 
and the time frame within which to meet the Standard are ne-
gotiated, fears of protectionism should subside because the par-
ties are addressing actual environmental concerns.130   
  
 127. See Jack I. Garvey, Article: A New Evolution for Fast-Tracking Trade 
Agreements: Managing Environmental and Labor Standards Through Extra-
territorial Regulation, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 1, 12 (2000) (arguing that 
the side agreements to NAFTA were designed not to secure sanctions)  [here-
inafter Garvey New Evolution]. 
 128. Garvey New Revolution, supra note 127, at 35 (arguing that when 
trade benefits and profits are at issue, governments demonstrate less concern 
about abstractions like sovereignty).   
 129. See Garvey New Revolution, supra note 127, at 18–23 (discussing the 
downfall of supranational standards in trade agreements).  
 130. See Garvey New Revolution, supra note 127, at 14 (explaining that 
imposition of a supranational structure would challenge Mexico’s sovereignty 
and the importance of focusing on enforcement of national law in NAFTA 
context; the problematic imposition of common legal standards of regulation 
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I suggest four categories for determining the period of time 
each country has to meet the agreed upon Standard, categories 
A-D (“Category”).  Countries falling within Category A are 
closer to the negotiated Standard than countries falling within 
Category D.  Therefore, countries falling within Category D re-
quire a longer period of time to meet the negotiated Standard.   
During the year or years the country is provided to reach the 
Standard, the country should not be subject to trade sanctions, 
provided it is following the Action Plan.       
 
 Time Frame in Years 
Category 
       
 
0-2 2-5 5-8 8-10 10-12 12-15 15-20 
A        
B        
C        
D        
 
C.  Compliance and Enforcement 
Provisions within trade agreements that provide for envi-
ronmental protection are worthless if the parties ignore them.  
Providing countries with the opportunity to negotiate the Stan-
dard should help lay the foundation for voluntary compliance.131  
If countries provide input on determining the Category in which 
they fall, the Action Plan and the applicable Standard, it is 
  
for the contrasting cultures, legal systems and stages of economic develop-
ment in relation to Canada and Mexico). 
 131. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2642 (1997) (discussing Professor Thomas Franck’s 
theory that the key to compliance is fairness of international rules).  “If na-
tions internally perceive a rule to be fair, they are more likely to obey it.”  Id. 
at 2645. 
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more likely that they will be inclined to follow the agreed upon 
plan.132  Further, the Action Plan should be tailored to specifi-
cally meet each country’s political, economical and environ-
mental needs.   
A mechanism that allows citizens or environmental groups to 
submit complaints should be included within trade agree-
ments.133  NAFTA’s environmental side agreement, the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(“NAAEC”), established the Commission for Environmental Co-
operation (“CEC”).134  The NAAEC permits groups or individuals 
alleging that a party to the agreement is failing to enforce its 
environmental laws, to file a submission with the CEC.135  Based 
on the success of the CEC to assess the impacts of NAFTA on 
the environment, a similar citizens’ mechanism should be in-
cluded in all future trade agreements to allow groups or indi-
viduals to allege that a specific trade or investment measure 
has an adverse impact on the environment.136  
Countries should be subjected to the same ramifications as 
trade violations if they do not follow the Action Plan, or satisfy 
the Standard within the allotted time frame.  Applying the 
same ramifications provides countries with an impetus to com-
ply with the provisions of the trade agreement.137  Trade sanc-
tions are a cost-effective means of securing compliance with 
otherwise difficult to enforce standards and agreements.138 
An organization similar to the bureaucracy provided in the 
NAAEC should be utilized.139  This organization would monitor 
  
 132. Id. 
 133. See Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere: 
Expanding the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
into the Americas, 33 ENVTL. L. 501, 504 (2003) (explaining that environ-
mental provisions in the Free Trade Area of the Americas should include a 
citizen submission mechanism similar to the NAAEC). 
 134. Id. at 508.  The CEC is comprised of a Council, Secretariat and Joint 
Public Advisory Committee. Id.  The Council is governing body of the CEC.  
Id.  The Secretariat acts as the operational arm of the Council, and the JPAC 
advises the governments on any matter within the scope of the NAAEC.  Id.     
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 504.   
 137. Garvey, supra note 2, at 254. 
 138. Id.   
 139. See supra note 134.  See also National Wildlife Federation, Promoting 
Greener Trade with Chile, Singapore, Nov. 2002, available at 
http://www.nwf.org/enviroaction/index.cfm?articleId=123&issueId=18. “Trade 
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compliance with the negotiated action plan and make sure that 
each country is on track to reach the negotiated Standard 
within the prescribed time frame.  However, the organization 
should be given a structure that is easily utilized by the parties 
to the trade agreement.  Some trade agreements may require 
four governing bodies.  Other agreements may require two gov-
erning bodies.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The U.S., one of the most powerful and influential nations, 
must lead in attaching standards for safeguarding the environ-
ment in trade agreements.140  It is undisputable that causes of 
environmental degradation are inextricably tied to trade.141  
Further, as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ex-
plained, the environment and trade are fundamentally linked 
because the environment provides many basic inputs of eco-
nomic activity (minerals, forests, etc.), as well as the energy 
used to process materials.142  The environment is limited and 
must be safeguarded for the economic viability of all countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
agreements should be accompanied by efforts to assess and improve interna-
tional environmental performance through cooperation, capacity-building 
assistance and technology transfer.”  Id.   
 140. James Salzman, Seattle’s Legal Legacy and Environmental Reviews of 
Trade Agreements, ENVTL. L. 501, 504 (2001).   
 141. See, e.g., Elia V. Pirozzi, Resolution of Environmental Disputes in the 
United States-Mexico Border Region and the Departure from the Status Quo, 
12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 371 (1997) (discussing damage to the border of the 
U.S. and Mexico caused by NAFTA).  
 142. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 105.     
File: Andrea4.23.04macro.doc Created on:  5/24/2004 5:37 PM Last Printed: 6/28/2004 9:55 PM 
1246 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:3 
The two agreements after JFTA demonstrate that the pendu-
lum has shifted back to a position where the environment is not 
as important as trade.  However, it is imperative that the 
President of the U.S. considers both the environment and trade 
when he utilizes TPA.  Fast track authority should not be used 
to bypass environmental concerns and just push bills through.  
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